This paper maps out the use of secret voting in the Italian parliament, tracing
Making legislative rules can be compared to making electoral rules. In both cases, […] parties seek rules that will help them win and that different rules favor different parties. Given these assumptions, the successful parties in a polity should support the rules and the rules should in turn help those parties. Although the literature does not use this term, a convenient analogy is that parties and rules are symbiants.
(Gary W. Cox 2006: 148) .
While secret voting in elections is currently judged essential for protecting voters from intimidation or coercion, secret voting in Parliaments is controversial. John Stuart Mill (1861 Mill ( / 1998 advocated for an open vote for electors on the basis of the moral obligation of the voter to consider the interest of the public and on the basis of voters' accountability to non-voters (for example women). This view was not shared by his father James Mill and other liberal philosophers like Jeremy Bentham. The old debate on secrecy has shifted its focus to parliamentary debates (but see Brennan and Pettit 1990). (lower) Chamber and ten in the Senate in 1868. It was decided that secret voting would prevail over open voting if competing requests were put forth (Rules of Procedure, Article 97). Thereafter, both secret voting for the final vote on bills and the norm of giving precedence to secret voting have been applied in the Italian Chamber, 3 with the exception of the Fascist period . 4 This situation lasted until secret voting for the final vote on bills was abolished in 1988 -one hundred and forty years after its introduction into the Italian Parliament. The survival of secret voting in the Italian Parliament's Rules of Procedure and its retention in specific matters to the present day seems at odds with the principles of popular sovereignty and accountability of representatives that inspired Italy's Republican Constitution of 1948.
Different explanations for this state of affairs may be proposed. On the one hand, the persistence of secret voting could be interpreted as an example of institutional "path dependence." On the other hand, it may also be argued that secret voting has been instrumental to the (changing) strategic purposes of key political actors; and that secret voting for bills was abolished when it no longer served a useful purpose in the eyes of some party leaders. This conjecture is consistent with an extensive rational choice literature that highlights the effects that institutions have on outcomes, and the "manipulation" of rules in order to secure desired outcomes (Shepsle 2006) . This paper will argue that secret voting was in practice used primarily as a strategic tool by governing parties' factions and opposition parties to (1) shape the content of legislation, and (2) determine the composition of governments.
The argument presented in this paper is structured as follows. In the first section the debate surrounding the use of secret voting in the 1948 constitution making process will be examined. In the second section there will be a brief description of the prevailing patterns of legislative-executive relations in the period 1948-1992. This will be followed by an account of the The fascist regime abolished secret voting in 1939 . Law No. 129 (January 19 1939 established the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations (Camera dei Fasci e delle Corporazioni) as the official name of the Italian Chamber of Deputies whose members were representatives of different branches of trade and industry. The law modified the previous constitution by introducing a provision which stated "voting is always open" (article 15). This provision was also introduced in the Parliamentary Rules for the Chamber (article 56) and for the Senate (articles 20 and 21) approved on December 1938: "Voting, in both the plenary assembly and in the committees, is always open. Voting can occur by hand, roll call and acclamation." main changes in the parliamentary rules of procedures from 1948 to 1988. In the fifth section, the strategic use of secret voting in the Italian Parliament, and its effects on government stability, will be examined through a number of case studies. In the sixth section, an account of the parliamentary process that led to the reform of secret ballot in 1988 will be presented. Thereafter, there will be some concluding remarks.
Secret Voting in the Constitution Making Process
Secret voting in the Italian constitution making process can be examined from two perspectives. The first one implies looking at the use of secret voting in the workings of the Constituent Assembly, as the Assembly adopted the same Rules of procedure that had been in force under the constitutional monarchy until 1922. The second perspective refers to the debate surrounding the decision about whether or not to adopt secret voting as a provision within the future constitution, and the actual decision taken on this matter. Both aspects are relevant for understanding the general principles used to justify secret voting and the strategic considerations by political actors in the constitutionmaking process (Elster 1995) .
The Constituent Assembly of the new born Italian Republic was elected by universal suffrage on June 2 1946.
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Its 556 members were elected by proportional representation in 32 multimember districts. A subcommittee of 75 members was nominated in order to draft the Constitution for the Italian Republic. The committee's proposals were then debated and voted through majority rule by the plenary Assembly. Any member of the Assembly could submit amendments. The Assembly operated until January 31 1948, holding 375 public sessions, 170 of which were devoted to constitutional debates. 6 The partisan allocation of seats in the Constituent Assembly shown in Table 1 shows that the largest party in the assembly was the Christian Democratic Party (DC) who had 209 seats. The second largest party was the Communist Party (PCI) with 104 seats. The socialists were divided into two
Simultaneously a national referendum led to the abolition of the monarchy and founding of the Republic.
6
The final text of the Constitution was approved by the Constituent Assembly on December 22 1947. The Constitution was proclaimed by the Head of State on December 27 1947 and came into force on January 1 1948. parties with 65 (PSI) and 49 (PSLI) seats each.
7
Other parties were the centrist Liberal (22 seats) and Republican (25 seats) parties. The right wing tendency was represented by the Fronte Liberale e Democratico dell'Uomo Qualunque (20 seats) and Unione Nazionale (13 seats).
<< Table 1, about here >>
The Constituent Assembly made extensive use of secret voting. Strategic motivations cloaked in arguments of principle are evident from the outset. In the session of April 23 1947, the first request for a ballot using secret voting was advanced by twenty deputies from liberal, republican and socialist parties.
The issue at stake was an amendment submitted by a socialist deputy, meant to abolish the word "indissolubility" (of marriage) in Article 23 of the future Constitution. It should be noted that deleting the expression "indissolubility of marriage" from the Constitution was interpreted by many observers as being anti-Catholic and indicating a pro-divorce stance.
The indissolubility of marriage vote followed a debate about procedural 
Executive-Legislative Relations in Italy, 1948-1992
Executive-legislative relations are of key importance in understanding the strategic use of secret voting. Consequently, it is important to focus on the main actors in the Italian political system and on how the relationship between ruling coalitions and opposition parties evolved over time.
The first elections in the history of the Italian Republic (April 18 1948) established the predominance of the DC and shaped in a lasting way the party system. In the Chamber the DC gained 305 seats, mostly at expense of minor centrist parties, while the Popular Front (Communists and Socialists) gained 183 seats. From 1948 to the early 1990s the configuration of the party system remained relatively stable. Seven parties (PCI, PSI, PSDI, PRI, DC, PLI and MSI) enjoyed a relatively stable level of electoral support throughout this period. The PCI was placed at an extreme of the left-right policy dimension and the MSI at the opposite extreme (Laver and Schofield 1990) . Both the PCI and the MSI were confined to permanent opposition given their "anti-system" stance. The DC was the largest party placed in the centre of the political spectrum. From the beginning the DC was compelled to form coalition governments.
8
The period from 1948 to the early 1990s may be divided into four distinct phases (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000) :
• The centrist coalition phase (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) when the DC formed governments with minor centrist parties • The centre left coalition phase (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) when governments included the Socialist Party (PSI) • The National Solidarity phase (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) when the DC formed minority governments with the abstention or the support of the Communist Party • The pentapartito (five parties) coalition phase (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) , when the DC governed with PSI, PSDI, PRI, and PLI These four phases differ in terms of the prevailing pattern of executivelegislative relationships. Up to the 1980s, the political scenario was dominated by the two largest parties, i.e. the DC and the PCI. The PCI was the largest communist party in any Western country. However, it was excluded by the government due to its ties with the Soviet Union. Political elites developed a pattern of cooperation captured with such terms as "consociationalism"
(consociativismo) or consensual democracy where ideological polarization, not cultural segmentation, was the main source of division (Lijphart 1968; Bogaards 2005 ).
This cooperation is well documented in the literature which shows that three-in-four of the laws approved by the Italian Parliament passed with the support of opposition parties including the Communist Party (Di Palma 1977; Cotta 1996) . Such consensus was equally high for laws approved through the so called decentralized procedure, i.e. by parliamentary committees, which was the most common procedure up to 1980s, or through the ordinary procedure i.e. by the floor.
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The literature stresses the micro sectional character of the Italian law-making (Zucchini 1997; Giuliani 1997 ).
In the national elections of 1976, the PCI came close to the DC in terms of electoral support gaining the 34.37% of the vote while the DC gained 38.71%.
Other parties entered the Parliament for the first time (the Radical Party, an extreme left splinter and the Greens). The collaboration between DC and PCI -defined as an "historic compromise" by political leaders and intellectuals -
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In 1953 the DC failed to change the electoral law in a majoritarian fashion that would have guaranteed the party a solid governing majority. 9 Constitutional and budgetary issues and international agreements require the ordinary procedure. The literature about coalition formation in Italy emphasizes a typical pattern of short lived governments (the mean cabinet duration was less than a year) coexisting with policy stability; as the coalitions that formed always included the DC as the largest and central party (Giannetti and Sened 2001) .
The heterogeneous nature of coalitions and especially internal divisions among parties are the key to understanding cabinet instability. The DC party had an institutionalized factional structure, but internal divisions were significant in other parties as well. The leader of the Christian Democrats, Aldo Moro, was kidnapped and murdered by the Red Brigade terrorist group in May 1978.
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The factional structure of Italian parties is well documented in the literature, starting from Sartori (1973) . The new Senate adopted different provisions concerning the use of secret voting. However the rules of procedure for the Senate maintained the precedence of secret over open balloting in cases of concurring requests (art 76). This provision was encapsulated in an amendment submitted by PCI deputies. The amendment was approved by a majority of 25 votes, i.e. 139 yes, 114 no (Casu 1986) . 13 This provision is still in place. It was ten in the Senate. MPs who are not affiliated with any particular party join a group of "others", the so-called Gruppo Misto. In some circumstances it was possible to form a parliamentary group even without the required number.
parliamentary activity had to be established by the Capigruppo using a unanimity rule.
14 The unanimity rule implied that there had to be an agreement among all the political groups represented in the parliament for the legislature to work effectively. This is why such a provision has been considered by many commentators as a key symbol of the consociational phase described in the previous section.
Rules disciplining the terms of parliamentary debate (articles 39 and 83) and the submission of amendments on the floor were established (article 85), but any leader of a party group could ask for a departure or dispensation from these rules. As a consequence of such wide discretion, only an agreement among the governing and opposition parties could guarantee the enactment of bills. Moreover, the Rules of Procedure (1971) In situations where there was no unanimity the decision shifted to the Chair of the Chamber who decided on the legislative agenda on a daily basis.
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The confidence vote was not requested very often the first two decades of the Italian Republic. See De Cesare (1998).
that ratified international treatises.
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The strategic importance of this provision can be fully understood by looking at one of the devices that the Italian executive has at its disposal in order to enact its own bills, i.e. the decree law procedure.
A decree law becomes operational immediately and remains in effect for sixty days without any parliamentary approval. If after this period the parliament has not 'converted' the decree into a regular law, then the status quo prevails. The executive could reissue any number of decree laws that failed to get converted. This provision passed thanks to an amendment proposed by Giulio Andreotti, a DC left wing faction leader. Andreotti was Prime Minister several times during the National Solidarity phase.
17
This situation lasted until 1996, when the Constitutional Court declared such a reissue of decrees to be unconstitutional.
Before analyzing the parliamentary process that led to the reform of secret voting, in the next section we will focus on the impact of secret voting on the legislative process and government termination.
Strategic Use of Secret Voting, 1979-1988
In the previous sections it was argued that the main actors in the political game devised parliamentary rules of procedures that were largely instrumental to their interests. Here it is important to stress the point that the secret ballot was seldom used when the relationships among government and opposition parties followed a pattern of cooperation in the legislative process. This is because the threat of requesting a secret vote that had the potential of revealing areas of dissent in the governing majority induced government and opposition parties to reach prior agreement on the content of legislation.
When the relationships among the governing and opposition parties evolved toward a more adversarial pattern, the use of secret ballot increased dramatically becoming a constant threat to government survival. Figure 1 shows the sharp increase in the use of secret voting during the legislatures VIII (1979 VIII ( -1983 , IX (1983 IX ( -1987 IX ( ) and X (1987 IX ( -1992 ). An examination of this data reveals that the use of secret ballot increased after the end of the National Solidarity phase (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) and the beginning of the pentapartito coalition governments (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) . In order to show how secret voting was an important strategic tool that allowed the opposition to exploit the divisions within the governing coalitions, the focus in this section will be on government termination.
<< Figure 1, about here >>
In order to set the context, it is important to outline the composition and duration of governments immediately prior to the reform of secret voting and its immediate aftermath, i.e. between May 1979 and June 1992. Table 2 shows the composition and duration of governments during the VIII, IX and X
legislatures. In what follows we will focus on four cases of government termination: 1) the termination of the Cossiga government in 1980; 2) the termination of Spadolini government in 1981; 3) the termination of Craxi government in 1986; 4) the termination of Goria government in 1988.
<< Table 2, about here >>
Cases 1) and 3) followed the same pattern: a decree law on a financial issue was introduced by the government requesting a confidence vote on it; this resulted in two votes in close succession, a confidence vote held by an open ballot and a secret vote on the same decree law; the government won the first (open) vote and then lost the second vote (secret) where between one-in-ten and one-in-five governing party MPs defied the party whip; this defeat, despite prior success in a confidence vote, led to the resignation of the prime minister and the immediate collapse of the government. These two episodes are striking because the first and the second votes occurred in sequence. Cases 2) and 4) also stem from being defeated through secret ballot in one or a series of votes, which may or may not have been preceded by a confidence vote.
Fall of the Cossiga I (DC) government, 1980
On September 27 1980 the Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga (DC) leading a coalition government composed of DC, PSI and PRI was compelled to resign.
The government had requested a confidence vote on the article converting into law decree law number 503 of 30 August 1980. This was a piece of legislation that contained important financial provisions. The lower chamber first held a confidence vote using an open ballot procedure where the government won by a reasonably margin with 329 votes as shown in Table 3 .
<< Table 3, about here >>
Immediately after the confidence vote, the chamber then voted on the same law using the secret ballot according to article 116 of the Rules of Procedure.
In this second secret vote the government was defeated as it garnered 297 votes in favour of the decree law. This loss of 32 votes representing a 10% decrease in support from the confidence vote taken a short time earlier illustrates how discipline within the governing parties weakened when secret voting was used.
Fall of the Craxi I (PSI) government, 1986
The government following the national elections of June 1983 was the first government in the history of the Italian Republic led by a socialist. The Craxi government was also the longest in the history of the "First" Republic, as it lasted for about three years as shown in Table 3 . However, one may see from the centre of Table 4 
Termination of the Spadolini (PRI) and Goria (DC) governments
The use of secret vote constantly undermined government survival throughout the 1980s. Two further cases of government termination that followed a secret vote defeating the government majority are the first pentapartito government led by Giovanni Spadolini (PRI) that formed on 28 June 1981 and the Goria government that formed on 29 June 1987. As shown in Table 4 , on August 7 1982 the government led by Spadolini resigned after a financial decree law (n. 430, to be converted into the law 3602) voted through secret ballot was declared inconsistent with the constitutional requirements of "necessity and urgency."
The cabinet led by Giovanni Goria (DC) was one of the most fragile governments in the history of the Italian Republic. Goria resigned three times:
on November 16 1987, on February 10 1988, and finally on March 11 1988. In the first two instances, the Head of State (the President of the Republic) sent the government back to the lower chamber where it passed an investiture vote.
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Decree law n. 133 of April 30 1986 to be converted into the law n. 3795
19
The first government resigning after losing a confidence vote was the Prodi government in 1998.
After the third resignation, it was replaced by another pentapartito government led by Ciriaco de Mita (DC). The Goria government was constantly under the assault by the so called franchi tiratori, a term given to legislators who did not follow the party line.
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The franchi tiratori phenomenon was a characteristic feature of the Italian Christian Democrat (DC) party where members of DC factions often voted against their own party under the protection of secret ballot.
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Here we will focus on the votes for passing the annual budget bill that preceded the second Goria government termination, by examining the nineteen parliamentary sessions held between January 18 (the day when the discussion on the annual budget bill began) and February 10 1988, the date of Goria's resignation (plus a preliminary session held on January 12 when two articles converting into laws decree laws related to the budget bill were defeated by the Chamber). The annual budget bill was composed of 42 articles, where more than two thousand amendments were submitted.
In the nineteen sessions under consideration the Chamber voted a total of no)
The evidence presented in Table 4 shows that the government passed eight confidence votes: two on January 24 (348 yes, 209 no; 349 yes, 210 no), two
20
The expression comes from military jargon, and in particular from the French word franctireurs, indicating groups of fighters who engaged in military operations against regular troops during the Franco-Prussian war.
21
There is a huge journalistic coverage of this phenomenon. See Casu (1987) 
The Reform of Secret Voting, 1988
The reform of secret voting was the outcome of an explicit attempt by the Table 4 .
<< Table 4, about here >>
The evidence presented in Table 4 shows how success in reforming the secret voting procedure sought by Italian party leaders was far from certain. Table 4 was on amendment 1-d, which was defeated by just three votes. Had amendment 1-d been approved, the reform of the secret vote procedure would have been fundamentally weakened because a unanimous agreement among parliamentary party leaders would have been able to secure use of the secret ballot on any specific vote they desired.
The special committee charged with reforming secret voting submitted its final bill to the floor of the lower chamber of the Italian parliament on October 13 1988. All of the opposition parties requested that the legislature vote on the secret vote reform bill article by article. The opposition parties hoped that this strategic approach would increase the likelihood that the reform of secret voting would fail because there would be more opportunities for defections from the party line. After a heated discussion, the Chair of the Chamber ruled that reform of the secret vote would be undertaken on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis, where there would be no scope for legislators to accept or reject specific provisions through a series of ballots.
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Eventually the bill reforming secret voting passed by a narrow margin with 323 supporting reform, 58 opposing, and 222 legislators, coming mainly from the PCI and Independent Left, abstaining. In this secret vote, the governing majority with 377 seats lost a considerable amount of support (54 votes or 14%) and consequently the reform bill passed with a slender majority of just 7 votes (or 1% of the total chamber) above the required majority of 316.
The PCI abstained on the final vote for two reasons: the party was officially in favour of introducing open vote for financial laws (maintaining secret vote on all the other laws); the outcome of the vote was highly uncertain and a defeat could not be excluded notwithstanding PCI abstention.
Following the reform of October 13 1988 use of secret ballot was, and still is, restricted according to article 49 of the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure, to the following circumstances.
[V]otes regarding persons, and, when so requested in accordance with Rule 51, in votes having a bearing on the principles, rights and liberties enshrined in Articles
This decision was highly contested as the Chair of the Chamber of Deputies was the PCI deputy Nilde Iotti. 
Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper has been to map out the use of secret voting in Source: Author's elaboration from data available at Italian Chamber of Deputies. Note duration of legislative terms and the number of secret votes have been normalized in order to remove differences that may result from variations in the absolute length of legislative sessions. This normalized estimate attempts to control for variation in absolute values where longer legislative terms would ceteris paribus be expected to have more secret votes. An alternative method is to present the average daily number of secret votes taken in a specific legislature term -an estimate that also controls for absolute differences in legislative terms. 
